



Case No.

S

**IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

MARIA DEL SOCORRO SANCHEZ-QUEZADA, etc., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent,

CAESARSTONE USA, INC. et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Review Sought from Summary Denial of Writ Petition
Second Appellate District, Division Seven (No. B347947)
JCCP 5378 (L.A. Sup. Ct. No. 22STCV37000)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	5
Issue Presented for Review	6
Statement of Facts	7
Reasons To Grant Review	10
I. Extraordinary Relief Is Appropriate In Cases Involving Coordination and Preference.	10
II. Judge Jessner’s Order Deprived Gonzalez- Morin’s Daughters of Their Preference Rights.	12
III. This Case Should Not Be In Any Coordinated Proceeding Because Judge Cunningham Found It Was Not “Complex.”	15
IV. Judge Jessner Improperly Overturned Both Judge Cunningham’s and Judge Mackenzie’s Prior Orders.	17
V. Judge Jessner Erroneously Failed To Exempt This Case From Coordination Due to the “Imminence” of Trial.	18
Conclusion	19
Word Count Certification	20
Appendix	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Alexander v. Superior Court</i> (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218	20
<i>Fox v. Superior Court</i> (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 52	11
<i>In re Marriage of Woolsey</i> (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 881	14
<i>Koch-Ash v. Superior Court</i> (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689	5, 11, 12, 15
<i>Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.</i> (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691	13
<i>Looney v. Superior Court</i> (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 521	11
<i>McGhan Medical Group v. Superior Court</i> (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804	10
<i>Miller v. Superior Court</i> (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1200	11, 13
<i>Ng v. Superior Court</i> (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29	10
<i>Pabla v. Superior Court</i> (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 599	13
<i>Paul Blanco’s Good Car etc. v. Superior Court</i> (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86	5, 17
<i>People v. Hall</i> (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950	14
<i>Pesses v. Superior Court</i> (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117	10
<i>Peters v. Superior Court</i> (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218	12, 13
<i>Rice v. Superior Court</i> (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81	11
<i>Swaithe v. Superior Court</i> (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082	13

Statutes and Rules of Court

Code of Civil Procedure section 36	11, 12, 13, 14
Code of Civil Procedure section 404	5, 15
Code of Civil Procedure section 404.6	11
Rules of Court, rule 3.400	15, 16
Rules of Court, rule 3.521(d)	6, 18
Rules of Court, rule 3.529(b)	14, 18
Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(4)	6

Other Authority

Eisenberg et al., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL APPEALS AND WRITS (Rutter Group 2018) para. 15.87, p. 15-47	10
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INTRODUCTION

Juan Rodrigo Gonzalez-Morin died of silicosis caused by exposure to respirable crystalline silica during his work as a stone countertop fabricator. His three minor daughters now bring this action through their mother, petitioner Maria Sanchez-Quezada, who is acting as their guardian ad litem and as Gonzalez-Morin's successor-in-interest. The trial court (Hon. David S. Cunningham III) determined that the action was not "complex" pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 404. The assigned trial judge (Hon. Alison Mackenzie) then granted trial preference because two of Gonzalez-Morin's daughters are under the age of 14. Trial was set to commence on August 11.

In late July, however, respondent court (Hon. Samantha P. Jessner) included the case in new state-wide coordination proceedings for stone countertop worker silicosis cases (JCCP 5378) and stayed the trial. In doing so, Judge Jessner disregarded Judge Cunningham's express finding that the case was not complex and, therefore, ineligible for coordination. Judge Jessner also disregarded Judge Mackenzie's subsequent order granting trial preference based on the ages of Gonzalez-Morin's daughters.

Sanchez-Quezada filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the stay of trial on substantive grounds. First, she argued that trial preference "is mandatory and absolute in its application and does not allow a trial court to exercise the inherent or statutory general administrative authority it would otherwise have." (*Koch-Ash v. Superior Court* (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 697.) Second, "[a]s a general rule, a trial judge cannot overturn the order of another trial judge." (*Paul Blanco's Good Car Co. Auto Group v. Superior Court* (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86, 99.) And, third, although the coordination

rules permit the imposition of a temporary stay while considering whether coordination is appropriate, “the imminence of a trial in any action otherwise appropriate for coordination may be a ground for summary denial of a petition for coordination, in whole or in part.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.521(d).) With a date of August 11, Judge Jessner acknowledged that the case was “on the eve of trial” and that trial was “imminent.” Sanchez-Quezada argued that Judge Jessner’s order staying the trial obviated Judge Cunningham’s finding that the case was not complex, as well as her (and her daughters’) vested right to preference.

On August 6, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) summarily denied Sanchez-Quezada’s petition. Her petition, which raises unique questions as to whether substantive and vested preference rights can be obviated by creation of new coordination proceedings, warrants extraordinary relief. Sanchez-Quezada requests this Court, as authorized by Rule of Court 8.500(b)(4), to grant review and transfer the matter back to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A case must be “complex” in order to be eligible for coordination and, once preference is granted, cannot be stayed or otherwise delayed due to matters of judicial administration. Judge Cunningham found this case was not “complex,” and Judge Mackenzie granted trial preference. Was it proper for Judge Jessner, when including this case in a new coordinated proceeding, to not only disregard Judge Cunningham’s finding that it was not “complex,” but also Judge Mackenzie’s order granting trial preference?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Gonzalez-Morin originally filed this action in November 2022 after his physicians diagnosed him with silicosis. {Ex. 1; R. 8} When he died in April 2023, Sanchez-Quezada amended the complaint to allege survival and wrongful death claims on behalf of his three minor daughters, Alondra Gonzalez, Candelaria Gonzalez, and Blanca Sanchez. The operative complaint alleges causes of action for negligence, strict products liability, breach of implied warranties, and fraudulent concealment. {Ex. 2; R. 61}

In August 2024, Sanchez-Quezada filed a motion for trial preference. {Ex. 3; R. 348} She brought the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (b), which provides that “[a] civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole.” {Ex. 5; R. 366} Sanchez-Quezada supported her motion with birth certificates showing that plaintiffs Alondra Gonzalez and Candelaria Gonzalez were born in September 2014 and August 2017, respectively. At the time, Alondra and Candelaria were aged 9 and 7. {Ex. 5; R. 369-373}

Judge Mackenzie continued the hearing on the motion for preference and, in September 2024, set an “order to show cause why this Court should not designate this case as complex pursuant to CRC 3.400.” {Ex. 7; R. 377} The trial court thereafter continued the motion for preference on its own motion. {Exs. 8, 9; R. 379, 380} Months later, Judge Cunningham issued an order finding that the case was not complex:

Due to Judge Samantha Jessner being unavailable this date, the case is reviewed by Judge David S. Cunningham

III. [¶] ***The Court has determined that the within action is not complex within the meaning of the California Rules of Court, rule 3.400.*** This determination has been made based on a review of the entire case file and, in certain instances, based on input from counsel during one or more status conferences. [¶] The case remains assigned in Department 55 with the Honorable Alison Mackenzie, at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.
{Ex. 10; R. 389, emphasis added}

Judge Mackenzie then continued the hearing on the motion for preference multiple additional times. {Ex. 11; R. 394} In March 2025, she held a hearing during which counsel referenced Judge Cunningham’s order finding the case not complex and that it remained assigned to Department 55. {Ex. 12; R. 403} Judge Mackenzie finally considered the motion for preference on its merits in April 2025 and granted it, setting a final status conference for August 1 and a jury trial for August 11. {Ex. 14; R. 903}

Around the same time, the Los Angeles Superior Court submitted a petition to the Judicial Council seeking to coordinate 79 countertop worker silicosis cases pending in different counties. {Ex. 13; R. 412} The petition, which acknowledged that the cases identified for coordination “are in varying stages of development,” did not seek to include Sanchez-Quezada’s case. {Ex. 13; R. 431} The petition also noted that “many of these cases are entitled to preference under Code of Civil Procedure section section 36.” *Ibid.*

Defendants C&C North America, Inc. and Arizona Tile, LLC filed a response to the petition, arguing that this case should be

included in the coordination proceeding. {Ex. 20; R. 1059} Sanchez-Quezada (along with other plaintiffs) filed a collective reply, cited Rule 3.521(d), and explained that Judge Cunningham previously deemed this particular case not complex. Plaintiffs further explained that “[s]ince the case was deemed non-complex, it is not subject to coordination” and “trial of this is also imminent, and should not be coordinated pursuant to Rule 3.521(d).” {Ex. 21; R. 1075} None of the defendants disputed that Judge Mackenzie previously granted preference under section 36 due to parties being under the age of 14. {Ex. 22; R. 1086}

On July 11, Judge Jessner issued a tentative opinion and heard oral argument on the coordination petition. {Ex. 23; R. 1095, Ex. 24; R. 1106} The tentative order granted the petition, but specifically exempted Sanchez-Quesada’s case and another from coordination, as well as the “stay automatically imposed by this Order under rule 3.529(b).” {Ex. 23; R. 1099, 1104} Judge Jessner’s stated rationale for exemption of these cases was because “motions for preference have been granted” and “trial is either begun or is imminent.” {Ex. 23; R. 1104}

On July 18, however, Judge Jessner disregarded that rationale and changed her ruling to not exempt any cases from the coordination and automatic stay. {Exs. 25, 26; R. 1140, 1167} Judge Jessner found that the purpose of coordination “is best served by a stay of all cases encompassed by the petition until further order of the coordination trial judge. [¶] Therefore, the Court directs that no cases encompassed by the petition . . . are exempt from the stay imposed by rule 3.529(b), including the two above-mentioned cases, *Gonzalez Quiroz* . . . and *Gonzalez-Morin*” {Ex. 25; R. 1149}

Sanchez-Quezada filed a timely petition for writ of mandate challenging Judge Jessner’s inclusion of the case in the coordination proceeding and staying the preference trial. In her petition, Sanchez-Quezada asserted that Judge Jessner’s ruling was incorrect and that the ages of Gonzalez-Morin’s minor daughters mandated that the preference trial commence as previously scheduled. On August 6, however, the Second Appellate District, Division Seven, issued an order summarily denying Sanchez-Quezada’s request for extraordinary relief. {Appendix} This petition now follows.

REASONS TO GRANT REVIEW

I.

Extraordinary Relief Is Appropriate In Cases Involving Coordination and Preference.

Code of Civil Procedure section 404.6 authorizes writ review of trial court orders concerning coordination of actions. In *Pesses v. Superior Court* (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117, the court noted that “[t]he petitions in this court are authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 404.6, establishing review by writ of mandate of superior court orders in coordination proceedings.” (*Id.* at p. 119; see also *McGhan Medical Group v. Superior Court* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 807 [“an order of the superior court either granting or denying coordination may be reviewed by a timely petition for mandamus”].) A leading treatise on writ procedure in California further notes that reviewing courts are often inclined to “grant a statutory writ without requiring a factual showing of inadequate legal remedy and irreparable harm on the theory that the Legislature has in effect determined these questions in the petitioners’ favor by authorizing writ relief.” (Eisenberg et al., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL APPEALS AND WRITS (The

Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 15.87, p. 15-47.) Where, as here, the question presented concerns matters of judicial administration, the applicable standard of review is de novo. (*McGhan Medical Group, supra*, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 810-811.)

In addition to being a statutory writ arising from the grant of an underlying petition for coordination, Sanchez-Quezada's petition also raised important issues concerning her and her daughters' substantive rights to trial preference. Judge Jessner's order imposing a stay, should it stand, deprives the daughters of their statutory rights to a preference trial based on their ages. Over the years, writ relief has been granted in many such cases because the harm resulting in any delay of a preference trial is, by definition, irreparable. (See, e.g., *Fox v. Superior Court* (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529; *Looney v. Superior Court* (1993) 16 Cal.App.5th 521; *Miller v. Superior Court* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1200; *Koch-Ash v. Superior Court* (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 699; *Rice v. Superior Court* (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 94.)

Moreover, in *Fox*, the First Appellate District noted that section 36 cases not only justify extraordinary relief, but they also present "unusual urgency, requiring acceleration of our normal process in writ proceedings." (*Fox v. Superior Court, supra*, at p. 536, citing *Ng v. Superior Court* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35.) Writ review was therefore not only appropriate based on the coordination issues and Code of Civil Procedure section 404.6, but also based on the fact that Judge Jessner's order contravened Judge Mackenzie's prior granting of mandatory trial preference under section 36, subdivision (b). As children under the age of 14, Gonzalez-Morin's daughters are indisputably entitled to trial preference.

II.

Judge Jessner's Order Deprived Gonzalez-Morin's Daughters of Their Preference Rights.

California law is well-settled that trial courts are required to grant preference in cases in which there are parties with a substantial interest that are under the age of 14. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (b); see also, e.g., *Peters v. Superior Court* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 224.) As the late Justice Woods wrote in *Peters*, “to construe [section 36] subdivision (b) as directory or discretionary would, in light of the all encompassing discretion conferred by subdivision (e) . . . deprive it of meaning and function.” (*Peters, supra*, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 224.) Real parties in interest never disputed that Gonzalez-Morin's daughters had an unqualified and vested substantive right to trial preference based on their ages. Indeed, real parties never sought reconsideration, or appellate review, of Judge Mackenzie's order. The underlying legal validity of Judge Mackenzie's decision to grant preference is not at issue here.

Moreover, it is fundamental that a case preferentially set for trial may not even be stayed by the judge to whom the case is assigned, let alone another judge. In *Koch-Ash v. Superior Court* (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, the court held that trial preference “is mandatory and absolute in its application and does not allow a trial court to exercise the inherent or statutory general administrative authority it would otherwise have.” (*Id.* at p. 692.) The *Koch-Ash* court observed that “[i]n the analogous context of the entitlement of unlawful detainer actions to the absolute trial preference conferred by section 1179a, it is uniformly held that trial courts have no discretion to temporarily stay such actions” (*Id.* at p. 697.)

Appellate courts presented with similar questions have more recently confirmed the mandatory nature of section 36. “A consistent line of precedent has arisen from writ proceedings involving the provisions of section 36[]’ and superior courts have ‘no discretion to avoid the command of section 36[] in the interest of efficient management of the court’s docket as a whole.” (*Pabla v. Superior Court* (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 599, 601, quoting *Miller v. Superior Court* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1200, 1204 [brackets in original].) The *Pabla* court acknowledged that the mandatory aspects of section 36, such as those set forth in subdivision (b), create difficulties for “overburdened superior courts.” (*Pabla, supra*, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 604.) But it nevertheless issued a peremptory writ in the first instance, holding that “until and unless the Legislature determines otherwise, this court is compelled to require respondent to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 36.” (*Ibid.*)

Here, Judge Mackenzie granted trial preference under the mandatory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (b). The statute is interpreted to provide that “those under 14 who have suffered personal injury or parental death . . . should be ensured timely access to the courts.” (*Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 696, citing *Peters v. Superior Court, supra*, 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 226.) This, like the other mandatory grounds for preference, reflects a “substantive public policy concern” that rises above convenience and other administrative goals. (*Swaithes v. Superior Court* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085-1086.) The *Peters* court, in turn, noted “this is a legitimate state purpose.” (*Peters v. Superior Court, supra*, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. p. 226.)

In granting preference, Judge Mackenzie necessarily found there was sufficient evidence that two of the plaintiffs were under the age of 14 and had substantial interests in the case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (b).) Judge Mackenzie thus made the legal and factual determination that the minor plaintiffs here, due to their loss of a parent and their ages, were entitled to a preferential trial of their claims. Again, real parties did not seek review, or otherwise challenge, Judge Mackenzie’s preference order. Upon its issuance and, as here, with the parties and Judge Mackenzie acting on it, the assigned preferential trial date should be considered “locked in.”

This is because section 36, subdivision (f), imposes strict time requirements for the commencement and conduct of trial. By imposing a stay notwithstanding the prior preference order, Judge Jessner erroneously gave priority to administrative and scheduling concerns rather than the minor plaintiffs’ statutory rights to preference. Judge Jessner also improperly imposed the stay pursuant to rule 3.529(b) despite its direct conflict with the timing requirements set forth in section 36, subdivision (f). Where “a statute even implicitly or inferentially reflects a legislative choice to require a particular procedure, a rule of court may not deviate from that procedure.” (*In re Marriage of Woolsey* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 881, 896, citing *People v. Hall* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 961-962.) As explained, the provisions of section 36 reflect our Legislature’s policy decision to assure that trials preferentially set actually proceed to trial. The “automatic” stay referenced in rule 3.529(b) should not be given precedence over section 36 and the substantive rights it codifies. Judge Jessner’s stay order, resting as it does on a rule of court, improperly elevates the rule over the statute.

Put simply, Judge Jessner's order erroneously interferes with the minor plaintiffs' previously-adjudicated right to trial preference. "If trial courts are permitted to make administrative inroads into the section 36 mandate, the effectiveness of that mandate will be eviscerated, if only to the extent that a litigant's section 36 rights will be jeopardized while appellate courts review circumstances seen by trial courts as justifying their revocation of trial preferences upon their own re-balancing of interests." (*Koch-Ash v. Superior Court, supra*, 180 Cal.App.3d at pp. 698-699.) Judge Jessner's order granting coordination and imposing an indefinite stay of trial improperly interferes with Judge Mackenzie's prior order granting preference.

III.

This Case Should Not Be In Any Coordinated Proceeding Because Judge Cunningham Found It Was Not "Complex."

Coordination of civil actions is governed by a set of statutes codified beginning with Code of Civil Procedure section 404. This statutory scheme only permits coordination of cases that are deemed "complex, as defined by the Judicial Council." (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.) Rule 3.400(a), in turn, provides that "[a] 'complex case' is an action that requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel." In determining whether a case is complex, the court must consider whether it is likely to involve numerous pretrial motions raising "difficult or novel legal issues"; a large number of witnesses or substantial documentary evidence; a large number of separately represented parties; coordination with

related actions pending in other courts; or substantial postjudgment judicial supervision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(b).) Here, Judge Cunningham applied those standards, and specifically ruled that this case was *not* “complex”:

Due to Judge Samantha Jessner being unavailable this date, the case is reviewed by Judge David S. Cunningham III. [¶¶] The Court has determined that the within action is not complex within the meaning of the California Rules of Court, rule 3.400. This determination has been made based on a review of the entire case file and, in certain instances, based on input from counsel during one or more status conferences. The case remains assigned in Department 55 with the Honorable Alison Mackenzie, at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.” {Ex. 10; R. 389}

Judge Cunningham’s finding as to the non-complexity of this case, whether correct or not, operated to render it ineligible for coordination as a matter of law. Judge Jessner, however, repudiated Judge Cunningham’s specific findings by generally finding that all “the cases subject to the petition are complex cases within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.400, and that this is an appropriate matter for coordination pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 404 and 404.1 and California Rules of Court, rules 3.501, et seq.” {Ex. 26; R. 1167} Judge Jessner did not acknowledge or address Judge Cunningham’s prior finding of non-complexity, but instead inconsistently deemed all the similar cases generally “complex” and, by her order, erroneously included this case in the coordinated proceeding.

IV.

Judge Jessner Improperly Overturned Both Judge Cunningham's and Judge Mackenzie's Prior Orders.

“As a general rule, a trial judge cannot overturn the order of another trial judge.” (*Paul Blanco's Good Car Co. Auto Group v. Superior Court* (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86, 99.) “Weighty concerns compel this long-standing principle. Fundamentally, it is founded on the inherent difference between a judge and a court and is designed to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Because a superior court is a single entity comprised of member judges, one member of that court cannot sit in review on the actions of another member of that same court.” (*Id.* at pp. 99-100, internal quotes and citations omitted.) “A narrow exception to this venerable rule applies when the record shows that the original judge is no longer ‘available.’” (*Id.* at p. 100.)

Since Judge Jessner, Judge Cunningham, and Judge Mackenzie are all superior court judges, none can properly overturn or repudiate rulings of another. Here, Judge Jessner did exactly that by including this case in the coordination proceeding and staying trial. This negated Judge Cunningham's order finding the case not complex, as well as Judge Mackenzie's subsequent grant of trial preference. Because Judge Jessner's coordination order and imposition of a stay conflicts with, and effectively overturns, Judge Cunningham's and Judge Mackenzie's prior orders, it was incorrect and in violation of the well-established rule that one superior court judge cannot overrule another. Judge Jessner's order should be modified so as to exclude this case from coordination and the associated stay so as to permit the preference trial to commence.

V.

Judge Jessner Erroneously Failed to Exempt This Case From Coordination Due to the “Imminence” of Trial.

Judge Jessner based her stay order on Rule 3.529(b), which provides that “[w]hen an order granting coordination is filed in an included action, all further proceedings in that action are automatically stayed, except as directed by the coordination trial judge or by the coordination motion judge under (c).” This rule, however, first and only applies “when an order granting coordination is filed in an included action” and does not address whether a particular action *should be* coordinated. That determination is subject to Rule 3.521(d), which states: “The imminence of a trial in any action otherwise appropriate for coordination may be a ground for summary denial of a petition for coordination, in whole or in part.”

In its order granting coordination, respondent court considered the facts to determine which superior court should be the site of the new coordination proceeding. One of two facts upon which Judge Jessner relied for recommending Los Angeles Superior Court was that “there are two cases *on the eve of trial* pending in Los Angeles.” {Ex. 25; R. 1148} Judge Jessner thus made a factual determination that, along with being given preference, this case was “on the eve of trial.” Indeed, Judge Jessner even referred to “the two cases in which trial is ‘imminent.’” {Ex. 25; R. 1149} Having made such factual determinations, Judge Jessner should have excluded this case from the coordination proceedings. Judge Jessner thus failed to properly apply her own factual determinations as to the imminence of trial in accordance with Rule 3.521(d).

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeal should not have, under the circumstances, summarily denied Sanchez-Quezada's petition for writ of mandate. Writ relief is appropriate in cases involving coordination and trial preference, and there are multiple distinct reasons as to why Judge Jessner's decision to stay the trial in this case is incorrect. Sanchez-Quezada requests this Court to grant review of the Court of Appeal's order summarily denying her petition and to thereafter transfer the matter back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to conduct further proceedings.

Dated: August 15, 2025

METZGER LAW GROUP, APLC

/s/ Brian P. Barrow

Brian P. Barrow

Attorneys for Petitioner

WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION

Counsel for petition hereby certifies that this brief contains
5034 words as measured by WordPerfect X9 word processing software.

Respectfully submitted,

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/s/ Brian P. Barrow

Brian P. Barrow
Attorneys for Petitioner

APPENDIX

(Order of Summary Denial dated August 6, 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

COURT OF APPEAL – SECOND DIST.

FILED

Aug 06, 2025

EVA McCLINTOCK, Clerk

C.Meza

Deputy Clerk

IN RE: STONE COUNTERTOP
WORKER SILICOSIS CASES

B347947

MARIA DEL SOCORO
SANCHEZ-QUEZADA et al.,

(Super. Ct. No. JCCP 5378)

Petitioners,

(Samantha P. Jessner, Judge)

v.

ORDER

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent.

CAESARSTONE USA, INC. et
al.,


Real Parties in Interest.

THE COURT:

The court has read and considered the petition for writ of mandate filed on July 31, 2025. The petition is denied.


MARTINEZ, P. J.


SEGAL, J.


STONE, J.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 555 East Ocean Blvd., #800, Long Beach, CA 90802.

On August 15, 2025, I served the foregoing document, described as: **PETITION FOR REVIEW** on the parties to this action as follows:

BY MAIL. I caused a copy of such document, enclosed in a sealed envelope, to be deposited in the mail at Long Beach, California with postage thereon fully prepaid to:

Honorable Alison Mackenzie
Los Angeles County Superior Court
Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Dept. 55
111 N. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(Trial Judge)

Honorable Samantha P. Jessner
Los Angeles County Superior Court
Spring Street Courthouse, Dept. 7
312 N. Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(Petition for Coordination Hearing Judge)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on August 15, 2025, at Long Beach, California.

/s/ Nina S. Vidal

Nina S. Vidal

ELECTRONIC PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 555 E. Ocean Blvd., 8th Floor, Long Beach, CA 90802.

On August 15, 2025, I served the **PETITION FOR REVIEW** on the interested parties to this action by submitting an electronic version of the document via FTP upload to File&ServeXpress.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on August 15, 2025, at Long Beach, California.

/s/ Nina S. Vidal

Nina S. Vidal

SERVICE LIST

(*Gonzalez Morin v. Architectural Surfaces Group*, No. 22STCV3700)

The following parties are the Defendants in the Superior Court case and Real Parties in Interest in this matter:

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updated 07/23/25 rlm